Legitimate Authority

第一章:合法性權威

The Paradoxes悖論

 

The study of the concept of authority has to confront two major prob­lems of intellectual origin:

對權威概念之研究面臨兩個智識上的問題

 

The methodological problem of how to avoid confusing the various quite distinct problems involving the notion of authority

有關方法論的問題即如何避免與權威概念相關聯的概念

 

and the problem of the paradoxes of authority.

權威概念的悖論[1]

 

To be subjected to authority, it is argued, is incompatible with reason

權威不能和理性共存

 

For reason requires that one should always act on the balance of reasons of which one is aware.

理性要求的是 斟酌考量

 

It is of the nature of authority that it requires submission even when one thinks that what is required is against reason. Therefore, sub­mission to authority is irrational.

權威本質上是服從,即使與理性相衝,因此權威是反理性的。

 

The principle of auton­omy entails action on one's own judgment on all moral questions. Since authority sometimes requires action against one's own judg­ment, it requires abandoning one's moral autonomy.

自治原則讓人根據自己對所有道德問題判斷行動,而有時權威與我們的判斷相衝,因此權威要求我們放棄道德自治。

Since all practical questions may involve moral considerations, all practical authority denies moral autonomy and is consequently immoral.

所有的實踐問題必牽涉道德考量,而實踐權威則否認了道德自治,而且帶來的不道德的結果。

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They challenge the possibility of legitimate, justified, de jure(合法性) authority. Their paradoxical nature derives not from their denial of legitimate authority but from the fact that the denial is alleged to derive from the very nature of morality or from fundamental principles of rationality.

它們這些悖論挑戰的是合法性、正當性、權威的可能性。這些悖論也並非源自於對合法性權威

的否認,卻是否認基於道德的性質或是理性的基本原則。

The arguments challenge the legitimacy not only of political authority but of all authority over rational persons.   

上述悖論不僅反對政治權威的合法性,也反對處於所有理性人之上的權威

 

If the very concepts of morality and rationality are incom­patible with that of authority, then even the sceptic will be able to know that all authority is immoral and submission to it is irrational.

如果道德與理性的概念與權威相對立,那懷疑論者將會認為所有的權威是不道德及服從它是不理性的。

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I shall try to show why the concept of authority gives rise to the apparent paradoxes and why they are merely appar­ent.

我LAZ 試圖說明權威概念會製造表面的矛盾,及它們僅僅是表面上的而已。

 

 A Methodological Detour 方法論的遶道

Modern authors have avoided this confusion, but discussion of the subject is still bedevilled with many methodological confusions. I shall describe briefly four of the common types of explan­ation and try to point to the lessons to be learned from their shortcomings.

現代學者對權威概念已經避免掉這些混亂,但在方法論上卻還是有許多混亂,下面我將四種常見類型作簡要的解釋並經驗上的教訓。

 

The first standard explanation consists in specifying the conditions that are in fact either necessary or sufficient for hold­ing effective (de facto) 事實authority.

第一種    說明 有事實權威的必要或充分條件

 

But they fail altogether to explain what these condi­tions are for, what it is to have authority or to be in authority.

但 此說法卻無法解釋,條件的原因與處於權威或有權威是甚麼意思。

 

 

 

The second type of explanation attempts to elucidate the nature of authority by describing the necessary or sufficient conditions for the holding oflegitimate (de jure)合法性 authority.

第二種    描述有合法性權威的必要性或充分條件

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According to it the concept of authority is to be explained by explaining how claims to authority can be justified.

據此說法對權威的概念則須要解釋該如何將其正當化。

 

 

We certainly need authority to per­form some actions but not others, and it appears, at least prima facie, that to say that one has a certain authority is to indicate that one could be either justified or capable of doing certain actions, without committing oneself in any way as to the nature of that justification.

我們須要藉助權威去實施行為,並且看起來.......,有人擁有一定權威則意謂著他能正當化或有能力去實施,某些行為,而毋庸參酌正當化的性質。

 

Here lies the major problem of justificative analyses of authority. None has so far succeeded in delineating the type of argument invocation of which is tantamount to a claim of authority.

對權威的正當化分析尚存有下列問題,即至今未能成功的描述與權威相當的論證方式。

 

Richard Tuck has suggested that citations of political authority are statements designed to kill criticism of a political action but are not authentic justifications.

RichardTuck就政治權威性之表達是為了消滅對政治行為的批評,但其本身非具有正當性。

 

They are based on the claim that (1) the action proposed or performed is right if somebody performs it; (2) it is neither right nor wrong that the person for whom authority is claimed should be that somebody; (3) that person in fact performed the action or pro­poses to do so.

是基於以下要求 1 如果被某人履行,則計劃或是提議的行為就是正確的

2 權威對於是否是此人無關緊要 3 此人事實上已履行該行為,或計畫去作。

 

Many will share Tuck's belief that nobody has a right to a position of (political) authority and that the only way to jus­tify political authority is by the use of arguments of the type he outlines.

許多人贊同 tuck: 無人有權處於權威地位,及證明政治權威之唯一方式是要利用他的方式。

 

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some people have a right and a duty by nature or by reason to rule. Such people, let us assume, are wrong. But are they also guilty of misusing language

但有些人生而擁有統治的權利和義務,以tuck 理論來看 是語言上的錯誤。

 

Is the mistake one of moral and political theory, or is it also a mistake about the meaning of words, about the concept of authority?

這一種錯誤是否是道德和政治理論的錯誤,還是語言意義與權威概念之錯誤?

One has to show that claim­ing authority on any other grounds is a misuse of language.

必須指出的是:基於其他理由對權威提出權威主張是對語言的誤用。

 

 

It must explain what one has when one has authority. This strongly suggests that authority is an ability to perform certain kinds of action." The analysis I have proposed here is meant to vindicate this suggestion.

(對權威)之解釋必須說明某人有合法性權威的條件,還必須說明有權威的實益,即權威是實施某些行為的能力 我LAZ所建議的分析將是支持此一說法。

 

3 One popular theory that regards authority as ability to perform certain kinds of action identifies effective (de facto)有效 authority with power over people.

第三種    權威作為某些實施行為的能力,證明有效權威與能力有關。

But it is a different notion of power that is involved here. According to it to have power is to have influence, to be able to influ­ence people's actions and their fortunes.  但此處所指的權力與其他不同,這的權力是指影響力,能影響人的行為及命運

 

A person has effect­ive authority if he is powerful, if he can influence people's fate and their choices or options." Legitimate authority can then be defined as justified effective authority.

某人具有影響力能影響他人的命運及選擇,那就是有有效權威了。基此合法性權威可被界定為合正當有效權威。

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The notion of legitimate authority is in fact the primary one. For one thing not all legitimate authority is effective. Besides (as I will claim shortly), the notion of effective authority cannot be explained except by reference to legitimate authority.

事實上合法性權威是主要概念,但並非所有合法性權威都有效,此外有效權威概念必須參考合法性權威。

 

The notion of legitimate authority is presup­posed by that of effective authority. A person needs more than power (as influence) to have de facto authority. He must either claim that he has legitimate authority or be held by others to have legitimate authority.

有效性權威以合法性為前提假設,有事實權威需要的不僅是權力,同時必須要有合法性權威,或被支持具有合法性權威。

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The brute use of force to get one's way and the same done with a claim of right. Only the latter can qualify as an effective or de facto authority.

以暴力使人屈服;以權利主張使人屈服,後者才是有有效或合法權威。

 

 

4........... that a person has authority means that there is a system of rules, which confers authority on him,which confers authority on him.

第四種    某人擁有權威意謂存在著一個規則體系,且將權威授權與他。

 

 

It states that people have authority only when it is conferred on them by some rules. But it does not provide any means of deciding which rules con­fer authority and which do not.

當得到某些規則授權時,孰人就有權威,然則此說並無提供哪些規則能授權哪些則否之方法。

 

The claim that all authority is conferred by rules is itself debatable. It is difficult to maintain that when a member of the public assumes authority in an emergency (for example, a fire in a theatre) his authority derives from any rules.

所有權威來源於規則本身就具爭議性的,當一個公共部門在緊急狀態下說有權威,很難講說是來自於規則,(如電影院的火災)

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If there are two systems of rules according to one of which a certain person has authority whereas according to the other he does not, then he both has and does not have authority. To avoid such a contradiction the proposed definition must be rel­ativized.

假設有兩種規則體系,據其一某人則擁有權威,而另一種體系則否認其有權威,所以他同時有權威同時也沒有。為避此一情況上述定義應相對化。

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Ill. The Simple Explanation 簡單解釋

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To make this assump­tion clear we can further amend his definition and say that X has authority over Y if his saying, 'Let Yψ, is a reason for Y to ψ Let us call this the simple analysis.

為使假定更清晰,我們修正(lucas之定義),如果X讓Y作ψ 是Y作ψ的理由,也就是X對Y有權威了。這就是簡單的分析(解釋)。

 

Two comments are in place here. 有兩點要說

First, I do not claim that authority can be explained only in terms of reasons.

第一、我並非說權威一定要借助理由才能解釋。

 

Second, a great variety of things are called reasons.

第二、很多事物能被指做理由。

 

 

It is in terms of complete reasons that the attempt to analyze authority will be made." I shall argue below that the simple explanation fails.

我將以完整理由的權威來分析,下面我要批評簡單解釋的失敗。

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To distinguish adequately between intentional and non-intentional exercise of authority and that it does not pay attention to the distinction between being an authority and having authority. It also overlooks the fact that one needs authority to grant permissions and to confer powers.

沒適當地區分,有意識或無意識權威行使,也無區分權威,與有權威,也忽略人需要權威之授權或許可的事實。

 

But first I shall examine some more far-reaching objections to it.

但我要檢驗那些對此更深遠的批判。

 

IV. First Objection to the Simple Explanation 簡單解釋的第一個批判

 

But are authoritative utterances prima facie reasons? Com­pare an order with a request and both with advice.

而權威言辭是首要的理由嗎?對比一下命令、要求、與建議。

 

All three are identified by the attitudes, beliefs, and intentions of their source, not by the way they are received by their addressee.

這三者辨認上取決於發出者的 態度、信念、意圖,而非接受者的接受方式。

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the adviser must intend his giving the advice to be taken as a reason to believe that what he says is true, correct, or justified. But he does not necessarily intend it to be taken as a reason for action, even though it may be the case that his giving the advice is a valid reason for action for the recipient."

建議者應該使其建議成為(接受者)相信或認為真實正確的理由,但不必使建議成為行為之理由,即便建議確實變成了接受者行為的有效理由(也無妨)。

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.....That a man issuing an order always intends it to be a very weighty rea­son and that is not always the case when people make requests.

….命令者總是希望命令是非常有力的理由,但對要求者來說事實並非如此

 

Apart from the fact that some requests are made with such an intention, this explanation seems unsatisfactory because it relies on an alleged difference in degree.

但必須要一部分的要求者要抱著這樣的想法,即這種說明是不足的,因為這區分僅是程度上的。

of this objection is that one requires author­ity to be entitled to command but one does not

(第一批判)問題點是人授權權威,可以發布命令,而非授權其僅提出要求。

 

My point is not that everyone is enti­tled to request.我不認為所有人有權提出要求。

 

My point is that the fact that one is entitled to request does not entail that one has authority over the addressee of the request.

我認為某人提出要求的事實並沒有使他有權威凌駕於接受者之上。

 

That one is entitled to command entails that one has authority over the addressee of the command.

有人有權提出命令,就有了對接收者的權威。

A request: made by a per­son entitled to make it is a valid (prima facie) reason or its addressee. 有權提出要求的人所提出的要求,是對接收者有效(首要)的行為理由。

 

Similarly a command issued by a person entitled to issue it is valid.

同樣地,有權提出命令者所(發布的命令)是有效的行為理由

If we are to say no more than that: a valid com­mand is a reason for its addressee, then we fail to explain the difference between a command and a request and the reason for which only entitlement to the first.

如果我們說,有效命令是接收者的理由,對解釋命令語要求之不同及第一位要求者的說明是失敗的。

 

 V Second Objection to the Simple Explanation 第二個對簡單解釋的批判

The first objection was based on an argument to the effect that if authority is ability to change reasons by certain utterances, then the utterances of authority are more than prima facie yet less than absolute reasons, which is an impossibility.

第一種批判 大概是,如果根據特定言辭,權威是改變行為理由的能力,而言辭是首要行為理由好過於絕對的行為理由是不可能的。

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The second objection is based on an argument to the effect that the utter­ances of (legitimate) authority though often reasons for action need not always be so. It consists of an appeal to our intuition based on a counter-example.

第二種批判 主要是說:合法性權威言辭常是行為理由,但不必總是這樣,它也可能來自於我們的直覺。

 

 

 

I am driving my car in flat country with perfect visibility and there is no other human being, animal, or car for miles around me. I come to a traffic light showing red. Do I have any reason to stop?

我行駛於平坦的鄉村路上,路上無人無動物或車,但當遇到紅綠燈我需要停嗎?

 

Many will say that there is not even the slightest reason to stop at the red light in such circumstances. They insist that this in no way contradicts their acknowledgement of the legitimate authority of those who made the traffic regula­tions.

大家會說,在此情況下連個最輕微停車的理由都沒有。人們堅持這樣作,絕無違背對交通規章權威的承認。

 

This example seems sufficient to convince one that in this case or a similar case the utterances of authority can be held to be legitimate without holding them to constitute reasons for action.

例子說明,這情況或類似情況,權威言辭儘管不構成行為理由卻仍是權威。

 

I think that these objections are sufficient to undermine the simple explanation and yet the simple explanation is right in its basic insight-that authority is ability to change reasons for action. 我認為這些批判可以侵蝕簡單解釋,可是簡單解釋的基調是正確的,                即權威是種改變行為理由的能力。

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[1] 悖論:詭局或詭辯,是指導致一種矛盾、弔詭的概念。從某種角度是對的;而從另種角度又是錯的。

 

 

 

VI. Normative Power

規範性權力

 

      His (the father’s ) instruc­tion to obey the mother is, therefore, a reason to act for a rea­son ( the mother’s instruction).  I shall call a reason to act for a reason a positive second-order reason.

他(父親)指示要服從母親是一個基於理由(母親的指示)而行動的理由。我稱一個基於理由而行動的理由為一個實證的第二階理由。

      There are also negative second-­order reasons, that is, reasons to refrain from acting for a rea­son (he orders his son not to act on his mother's orders). I shall call negative second-order reasons exclusionary reasons.

也存在反向的第二階理由,那就是,去限制基於一個理由而行動的理由(他命令他兒子不要基於母親的命令而行動)。我稱反向的第二階理由為排他性理由。

      There is one important point to bear in mind concerning second-order reasons: they are reasons for action, the actions concerned being acting for a reason and not acting for a reason.

關於第二階理由很重要而須銘記在心的一點是:存在著為了行動的理由,這些行動在乎的是成為一個基於理由而為的行動和基於理由而不為這個行動。

      If is a reason toψthen acting tor the reason that P isψ-ing for the reason that P.  Not acting for is notψ-ing for the reason that P. This is compatible with ψ-ing for some other reason as well as with notψ-ing at all.

如果P是一個去做ψ的理由,那因為理由P所做的行動就是因為理由P所做的ψ行動。因為P而不做的行動並非因為理由P而不做ψ行動。這和因為其他理由不做ψ行動是相容的,就像這和完全不做ψ行動是相容的一樣。

One may fail to act on a reason because one does not know of its existence.

一個人可能無法基於一個理由而做這個行動,因為他並不知道這個理由存在。

the father tells him (the son) not merely to do what she tells him to do but also to do it for the rea­son that she tells him so.

父親告訴兒子不要僅是做母親要他做的,而同時要因為母親告訴他這麼做而作為這麼做的理由。

when the father tells his son not to obey his mother, he is not telling him never to do what his mother tells him to do but merely never to take her instructions as reasons for action.

當父親告訴兒子不要服從他的母親,他並不是告訴他說永不做母親要他做的,而是永不要僅是將她的指示作為行動的理由。

...... the fact that is a reason (the father's order) for disregarding certain rea­sons (the mother's instruction) forψ-ing (wearing the coat) is

......這個事實是一個理由(父親的命令)去忽略特定理由(母親的指示)去做ψ行動(穿上外套),

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different from any fact that is a reason (the coat's ugliness) for notψ-ing.

這和任何事實是一個理由(外套很醜)不要去做ψ行動是不相同的。

But sometimes the same fact is both a reason for an action and an (exclusionary) reason for disregarding reasons against it.  I shall call such facts protected reasons for an action.

但有時同樣的事實同時是這麼做的理由和忽視與之對抗的理由的排他性理由。我稱這樣的事實為行動的保衛性理由。

   I will define normative power as ability to change protected reasons.

我要把規範性權力定義為改變保衛性理由的能力

      An act is the exercise of a normative power if there is sufficient reason for regarding it either as a protected reason or as cancelling protected rea­sons and if the reason for so regarding it is that it is desirable to enable people to change protected reasons by such acts, if they wish to do SO.

如果有充分理由將規範性權力認作保衛性理由或取消保衛性理由,以及如果這麼認為的理由是其希望能使人們可以藉著該行動去改變保衛性理由(如果他們想這麼做的話),那行動就是規範性權力的實踐。

I shall assume that power is used by making what I shall call 'power-utterances'.

我假定權力是藉著創造出我所謂的權力話語而被使用

The first is by issuing an exclusionary instruction, that is, by using power to tell a person to tP,the power-utterance is a reason for that person to tP and also a second-order reason for not acting on (all or some) reasons for notψ-ing. Exclusionary instructions are, therefore, protected reasons.

首先是藉著說一個排他性指示,也就是,藉著使用權力去告訴一個人去做ψ行動,這個權力話語是那個人去做ψ行動的理由,而且同時是一個不要基於(全部或其他)理由而不做ψ行動的第二階理由。

The second way of exercising power is by making a power-utterance grant­ing permission to perform an action hitherto prohibited by an exclusionary instruction. I shall call such permissions 'can­celling permissions' for they cancel exclusionary reasons.

實踐權力的第二種方式是藉著權力話語而給予權限去做一個至今被一個排他性理由所限制的行動。我稱這個准許為「取消的權限」,因為它取消了排他性理由。

The third form of using power is by conferring power on a person. This does not in itself change protected reasons, but it ena­bles a person to change them. The power a person has can be restricted in many ways-in the way it can be exercised, the per­sons over whom it is held, the actions with respect to which the power-holder can make power-utterances, and so forth.

使用權力的第三個形式是藉著賦予一個人權力。它自己沒有改變保衛性理由,而是使一個有能力去改變。

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VII. Power and Authority權力和權威

...... we can divide powers into powers over oneself (the power to undertake voluntary obligations) and pow­ers over others (the authority over them) .

我們可以把權力區分為對於自己的權力(自願去承擔義務的權力)和對於其他人的權力(對於他人的權威)

There is one exception ...... a person has authority over himself.  This is a degenerate case of authority: an exten­sion by analogy from the central cases of authority over others.

有一個例外......一個人有對於他自己的權威。這是一個衰落權威案例:藉著從對於他人權威的中心例子所比喻的範圍。

One of the main obstacles to an analysis of authority is the frequent failure to distinguish between authority to perform an action and authority over persons.

對於權威分析的主要障礙是,我們總無法區分去為一個行動的權威和對於他人的權威。

--------------------------------p19

      the source of a person's authority to perform an act must have power to confer it, but he need not have authority over the per­son on whom he confers authority. (like the signing cheques case)

一個人去為一個行動的權威的根源必須有權力賦予他(去這麼做),但賦予權威的人並不需要對被賦予權威的人有權威(就像單據代簽名的例子)

We can now define X has authority toψas: there is some Y and there is some Z such that,

我們現在可以定義X有去做ψ行動的權威:有某Y和某Z像是,

(1)     Y permitted X toψor gave him power to do so

Y准許X去做ψ行動或者給予他這麼做的權力

(2)     Y has power to do so

Y有權力這麼做

(3)       X’sψ-ing will affect the interests of Z and Y has authority over Z.

X所為的ψ行動影響了Z的利益,以及Y對於Z有權威

代入例子:

Y→ 債權人;X→ Y之代理人 ; ψ→要求履行債務的行動;Z→債務人

須注意者,這裡還有權力和權利區別的問題,可能不見得很適合

Or

Y→ 政府;X→ 公權力受託人 ; ψ→ 為行政處分;Z→ 一般人民

例如學位證書授予

----------------------------p20

 

VIII. Refuting the Objections對於反對意見的反駁

Refuting the Fist objection第一個反對意見的反駁

It is, however, important to see that authority can be exercised without the person having authority intending to invoke it (with orders or requests).

看見權威能不以一個有權威的人想要一件事發生(藉著命令或要求)而實行是很重要的。

Advice, whatever the hopes or the adviser may be, is given with the intention that its utterance will he taken as a reason for belief, not for action.

建議,不論其中的願望或建議者可能是什麼,都是以希望他的話語會被採取為信仰(而不是行動)的理由而給予。

  ... the recipient of the advice may regard it: as both a reason for action and an exclusionary rea­son for disregarding conflicting reasons.

建議的接受者可能會這麼認為:其同時是一個行動理由和忽略相衝突理由的排他性理由。

---------------------------------p21

If he follow the advice given without trying to work out whether it indicates reasons that tip the balance, he is in fact excluding all the conflicting reasons of which he is aware from his considerations. ...... the advice (is) both as a reason to perform the action he was advised to perform and for not acting on conflicting reasons.

如果他依循建議且沒有試著去確定其所指示的理由是否舉足輕重,那他就排除了其思考時所注意到的所有相衝突的理由......建議同時(是)做為建議他這麼做的為一個行動的理由,以及不基於相衝突的理由而行動的理由。

......the advice he received to be a pro­tected reason, even though advice is not given with an intention to be taken as a protected reason.

......他所接受的建議成為了保衛性理由,即使這個建議並非是以希望被採取為保護性理由而被給予的。

Orders, on the other hand, are given with the intention that their addressees shall take them as protected reasons.  They (People) are entitled to do so (give orders) only if they have authority (power) over the addressee with respect to the subject-matter of the order.

命令是以希望被接受者採取為保護性理由而被給予的。他們(人們)被授權這麼做(下命令)只因為他們以對命令的subject-matter的尊敬而對於接受者有權威(權力)

The order may be a valid first-order reason for performing the act even if it is not a valid exclusionary reason not to act on conflict­ing reasons, and it may be both even though the person who issued it has no authority to do so.

命令對為一個行為而言可能是一個有效的第一階理由,即使其不是一個不基於相衝突理由而行為的有效的排他性理由,以及,即使它可能是由一個沒有權威這麼做的人所發出的。

But it always is a valid first­-order reason and an exclusionary reason if he has the authority to give it.

但,如果一個人有權發出命令,其會是一個有效的第一階理由和排他性理由。

They (exclusionary reasons) may not exclude certain conflicting reasons, and when this is the case one must decide what to do on the balance of the non-excluded first-order reasons, including the order itself as one prima facie reason for the performance.......

排他性理由可能不會排除特定的相衝突理由,一個人應該決定基於非排除性的第一階理由的平衡而應做什麼,這些第一階理由中包含了作為行為的初步理由的命令本身。

What then is the difference between an exclusionary rea­son and a first-order reason of a weight sufficient to override all the conflicting reasons that are excluded by the exclusion­ary reason and no others?

那麼,一個排他性理由和一個具有足夠份量而凌駕於所有因排他性理由而被排除的相衝突理由之間有什麼不同?

First, exclusionary reasons exclude by kind and not by weight. They may exclude all the reasons of a certain kind (economic welfare) ..., including very weighty reasons, while not excluding even trivial consid­erations belonging to another kind (honour)...

首先,排他性理由是依據種類而不是份量而進行排除。其可能排除所有特定類別的理由...,這含了非常有份量的理由(經濟福利),卻不排除屬於其他類別的微不足道的考量(榮譽)

-----------------------p22

Second, regardless of the different impact of exclu­sionary and weighty reasons on what ought to be done, all things considered, they also differ in the way we view them. Some facts are weighty reasons overriding conflicting reasons; others are not to be compared with conflicting reasons. Their impact is not to change the balance of reasons but to exclude action on the balance of reasons.

第二,忽略排他性理由和具分量的理由在應該怎麼做這件事的影響,把所有事情都納入考慮,也因為我們的觀點而有不同。某些事實是凌駕於相衝突理由的有分量理由,其他則並不與相衝突理由做比較 (黑體這句我看不懂) 。它們的影響並不改變理由間的平衡,而是排除了基於理由間的平衡而行動。

This difference in function...... explains the difference between orders and requests.The difference is not in importance but: in mode of operation.

這種功能上的不同......解釋了命令和要求的不同。這種不同並非在於重要性,而是在於:操作的形式。

A request is made with the intention that it shall be taken as a reason for action and be acceded to only if it tips the balance.

要求的提出是以希望能被採取為行動理由和只有在其至關重要時被同意時

Orders are made with the intention that they should prevail in certain circumstances even if they do not tip the balance.

命令的提出是以希望在特定環境能是風行草偃的,即使它們並不是至關重要的

風行草偃:風吹向草原,草是無法不低頭的,這並非是風強迫草低頭,而是低頭在此事對草而言是不可能的→ prevail(直譯是戰勝)指做出某事而引發某種結果,卻又不是強迫後者所為,類似的狀況如:渴了要喝水,餓了要進食等(這樣的例子其實還沒有風行草偃貼切)

They are intended to be taken as reasons for excluding certain others that may tip the balance against performing that action.

命令是希望被採取為排除至關重要的、對抗為一個行動的特定其他理由的理由

Having assumed that the difference between them lies in their practical implications, I submit that it consists in the fact that orders but not requests are protected reasons.

假設它們的不同在於它們的實證影響,我不得不接受存在於命令是保衛性理由而要求不是的事實。

There is a minimum that an order must exclude to be an order. It must at least exclude considerations of the recipient's present desires.

命令要成為一個命令有必須排除的最小部分。其必須至少排除接受者當前的欲望思考。

----------------------------------------p23

When such considerations (obeying would lead to a strong moral reason for not doing so or severely damage the recipient’s interests or be unlawful) amount to a justification and lead the agent not to follow the order, he cannot be said to have obeyed it but neither did he dis­obey it. It was not intended that he should follow it in such cir­cumstances.

當這樣的思考(服從會導致不這麼做的強烈道德理由或嚴重傷害接受者的利益或使其不合法)等同justification,以及導致這個人不跟從命令,那就不能說他有服從命令,也不能說他沒有服從。命令並不希望他在這樣的環境 下要服從。

...it is never a justification that the agent had a desire, however strong, for something inconsistent with his fol­lowing the order.

永不會有這種justification,代理人對於某種和其所跟從的命令不一致的行具有強烈欲望。

...one who commands is not merely trying to change the balance (of reasons) by adding a reason for the action. He is also trying to create a situation in which the addressee will do wrong to act on the balance of reasons. He is replacing his authority for the addressee's judgment on the balance.

一個人的命令並不僅試藉由增加行動理由而改變(理由的)平衡。也試著創造一個接受者會基於理由的平衡而做錯的情況。對於接受者基於這個平衡的判斷,其取代了他的權威。

-------------------p24

Refuting the second objection第二個反對意見的反駁

We can go further than that (one accepts the legitimacy of an authority one is committed to following the authority regard­less of one's view of the merits of the case, that is, blindly) and say that sometimes the very rea­sons that justify the setting up of an authority also justify follow­ing it blindly in a stronger sense--that is, following it without even attempting to form a judgment on the merits.

(比起,一個人接受權威的正當性是允諾跟從權威而忽視他自己對於個案的觀點,也就是,盲目地)我們可以更進一步且說有時證成權威的設立的特定理由也在一種強烈感中證成了盲目地跟隨它──也就是,甚至是不想要基於價值而形成一個判斷地跟隨它。

And if he is to inquire in this case (the traffic light case), he has to inquire in many other cases. ......for we know in advance what the merits are and forget that he has to find that out, and not only now but in many other cases as well.

如果它在這個例子(交通號誌的例子)中這麼要求,那它也必須在許多其他例子中這麼做......因為我們事先知道了那個價值是什麼,並忘了它必須要把它找出來,以及不僅現在而且在許多例子中也是一樣。

 

IX. Dissolving the Paradoxes消除矛盾

-----------------------------p25

 I shall examine the paradoxes as presented by Robert Paul Wolff: 'Men', he says 'can forfeit their autonomy at will. That is to say, a man can decide to obey the commands of another without making any attempt to determine for himself whether what is commanded is good or wise'.

我要檢查Robert Paul Wolff提出的矛盾:「人」,他這麼說:「能在意志上喪失他們的自主性。這是說一個人能決定去服從另一個人的命令而不試著決定那命令對他來說是好的或明智的。」

Wolff is making two valid and important points here.

Wolff在此創造了兩個有效而重要的觀點

    (1)Because an order is always given with the intention that it be taken as both an exclusionary reason and a first-order rea­son, its addressee has more options than either to disregard the order altogether or to obey it as he was intended. He may hold it to be a valid first-order reason, given the circumstances of its utterance, while denying that it is an exclusionary reason.

因為命令總是以希望同時被採取為一個排他性理由和一個第一階理由的方式而提出,比起完全忽略命令或依其所希望地被服從,他的接受者有更多選擇。他可能將命令做為一個有效的第一階理由,given the circumstances of its utterance,而否認其是一個排他性理由。

(2) This means that an anarchist can reject the legitimacy of all authority while giving some weight to the instructions of de facto authorities.

這表示一個專制主義者可以拒絕所有權威的正當性而給予事實上權威的指示某些分量。

---------------------------p26

Wolff ......correctly assumes that reason never justifies abandoning one's autonomy, that is, ones right and duty to act on one's judgment of what ought to be done, all things con­sidered. I shall call this the principle of autonomy.

Wolff 正確地假設理由永不會證立出放棄一個人的自主性,也就是,一個人,考慮到所有東西,基於其自身的、什麼應該被完成的判斷而行動的權利和義務。我稱之為自主性原則。

Wolff wrongly assumes that this is identical with the false principle that there are no valid exclusionary reasons, that is, that one is never justified in not doing what ought to be done on the balance of first-order reasons. I shall call this the denial of authority.

Wolff 錯誤地假設其乃是以不存在有效的排他性理由的錯誤原則而被區別出來,也就是,一個人永不會是有道理的,當其基於第一階理由的平衡而不做應該被完成的事。我稱之為權威的否認。

If all valid reasons are first-order reasons then it is a necessary truth that the principle of autonomy entails the denial of authority, for then what ought to be done all things considered is identical with what ought to be done on the balance of first-order reasons. But since there could in principle be valid second-order reasons, there is noth­ing in the principle of autonomy that requires the rejection of all authority.

如果所有有效理由是第一階理由,那自主原則繼承了權威的否定是必要的真實,因為思考所有事中的那些該被完成是基於第一階理由的平衡而區別出來的。但原則上存在著有效的第二階理由,所以不存在要求全部權威反對的自主性原則。

 

 

 

 

 

The Authority of Law

第二章  The Claims of law 法律的宣稱

Can the very abstract analysis of authority in the previous essay be applied to the law?...... Two preliminary objections must be tackled first.

對權威的分析是否能適用於法律?先解決兩個基本的反對意見

  1. It is a popular view that the law enjoys de facto or effective authority. Its analysis involves these concepts but not necessar­ily that of a legitimate authority.

一種普遍的觀點認為法律享有事實的或有效的權威,對法律的分析只須涉及這些概念,但不必然包含合法性權威的概念。

 

This is a mistake. To hold that a government is defacto government is to concede that its claim to be government de jure is acknowledged by a sufficient num­ber of sufficiently powerful people to assure it of control over a certain area.

這種觀點是錯誤的,同意某一政府是事實上的政府也就表示有眾多的有影響力的人民承認他的合法性,以確保它能控制特定領域。

 

A common factor in all kinds of effective authority is that they involve a belief by some that the person concerned has legitimate authority. Therefore, the explanation of effective authority presupposes that of legitim­ate authority.

在所有有效的權威中的一種普遍因素是,他們涉及一個信念:就是相關的人擁有合法性權威。因此對有效權威的解釋以合法性權威做為前提。

 

-------------------------------------------p29

2. Authority was analysed in the context of a person in authority and his authoritative   utterances. Such an analysis could in principle apply to a legislator and his acts of enact­ment. But not all law is enacted. Customary rules can be legally binding. Can they he authoritative despite the fact that they are not issued by authority?

權威是在權威者以及權威指令的背景中被分析。這種分析原則上也能適用於立法者以及立法行為。但不是所有法律都是制訂法。習慣規則也可能有拘束力。如果他們不是權威機關頒布,那它還能有權威性嗎?

 

 It. is possible to talk directly of rhe authority of the law itself

直接討論法律本身的權威是可能的

 

    a law is authoritative if its existence is a reason for conforming action and  for excluding conflicting consid­erations

    如果法律的存在是行動的理由並且是排他性理由,那它就有權威。

 

-------------------------------------------p30

 

It is indeed plain that to determine our proper attitude to the law we must examine whether the law has authority over us which we should acknow­ledge.

要決定我們對法律的態度,就必須檢討一下法律是否擁有我們應該承認的權威。

 

which non-conforming behaviour is or is not a breach of law

不服從行為是否違法

 

The way to interpret the fact that conformity is required even in the absence of other reasons for it is that the law itself is presented as such a reason.

即使沒有其他理由,法律本身就可提供服從的理由。

 

The law's claim to legitimate authority is not merely a claim that legal rules are reasons. It includes the claim that they are exclu­sionary reasons for disregarding reasons for non-conformity.

法律對於正當權威的宣稱,不僅主張法律規則是(行動)理由,還包括主張它們是無須考慮不服從理由的排他性理由。

 

non­legal reasons do not justify deviation from a legal requirement except if such justification is allowed by a specific legal doctrine.

非法律理由不能證立違背法律要求的正當性,除非這些證立得到具體法律理論的授權。

 

It may be thought that the law ought to give recognition to all relevant considerations, that failure to do so is a moral defect in the law.

我們可能認為法律應當得到承認所有相關因素,不能承認是法律的道德瑕疵。

 

-------------------------------------------p31

 

But it is practic­ally impossible for the law to recognize all the considerations relevant to cases to which it applies.

對法律來說承認和案件相關的因素是不可能的。

 

If the law has moral author­ity then this authority must be established by showing, among other things, that it is better not to enable courts to apply cer­tain considerations than not to have law at all.

如果法律有道德權威,那這權威確實表明,不讓法庭適用某些因素比沒法律還好。

 

to have a general power to exempt from the law on grounds of hardship or justice. This may be justified with respect to certain legal problems. But in many areas this cure will be worse than the disease.

就特定法律問題中,因為困難或正義等原因,擁有使個案免於適用法律的一般性權力,但是在多數場合下這種治療比疾病更糟糕。

 

-------------------------------------------p32

what is excluded by a rule of law is not all other reasons, but merely all those other reasons which are themselves not legally recognized.

被排除的不是其他所有理由,而是那些在法律上得不到承認的理由。

 

創作者介紹

基礎法學......

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